Must Employees Claiming Discriminatory Discharge Prove The Reason For Discharge Was False?
Having represented employment discrimination victims for more than two decades, our employment discrimination lawyers in Citrus County, Florida know a common employment law myth is that employment discrimination victims do not have a meritorious case unless they can prove that the employer’s proffered reason for their termination was false or factually untrue. Under this employment law myth, as perpetuated by employers and employer-friendly courts, if the employer’s proffered reason for the termination was true or factually accurate, employees claiming a discriminatory discharge cannot prevail.
Although employees may prove a discriminatory discharge case by showing that the employer’s stated reason for the termination was false or factually inaccurate, they are not required to do so in order to prevail in a discriminatory discharge case. Rather, employees can still prevail in a discriminatory discharge case by showing that the termination was motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s race, national origin, sex, pregnancy, or religion—even if the employer’s proffered reason for the termination was true or factually accurate. In other words, the employer’s reason, while true, was only one of the reasons for the termination decision, and another reason for the termination decision was the employee’s race, national origin, sex, pregnancy, or religion. Under some circumstances, therefore, there can be two reasons or motives for an employee’s termination: (1) a factually true reason; and (2) the employee’s race, national origin, sex, pregnancy, or religion. Showing that the employee’s termination was motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s race, national origin, sex, pregnancy, or religion is sufficient under federal employment discrimination law to prove a discriminatory discharge case.
In this article, our employment discrimination lawyers in Citrus County, Florida explain how the decision in Bart v. Golub Corp., 2024 WL 1281069 (2d Cir. March 26, 2024) demonstrates that employment discrimination victims are not required to prove that the employer’s proffered reason for their termination was false or factually inaccurate in order to prevail in a discriminatory discharge case.
Discriminatory Discharge Case
In that case, a woman named Bart brought a discriminatory discharge claim against her former employer, Golub Corporation (“Golub”), pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of race, national origin, sex, pregnancy, or religion. Bart claims that she was fired because of her sex in violation of Title VII.
Bart worked as a team leader managing the food service and deli departments at Price Chopper supermarkets operated by Golub from 2011 to 2018. In the summer of 2017, Bart was transferred to the Price Chopper in Oxford, Connecticut. A man named Pappas became Bart’s immediate supervisor. Bart alleges that Pappas made several remarks to her expressly indicating gender bias. Specifically, Bart testified that Pappas remarked directly to her on at least three occasions that “he didn’t think women should be managers.” She also testified that he stated in her presence that being a manager was “too stressful” for women and women were “too sensitive to be managers.” According to Bart, the most recent gender-based remark was made in June 2018.
After her transfer to the Oxford Price Chopper, Bart was disciplined on multiple occasions. In April 2018, she was disciplined for “failing to keep logbooks properly.” A few months later, on August 16,2019, “Pappas formally admonished her for several deficiencies in her departments.” Ten days later, on August 26, 2018, Bart was disciplined a third time for falsifying food logs, for which she admitted responsibility. Two days later, on August 28, Pappas documented the circumstances surrounding the August 26 incident, as well as more issues with Bart’s performance, in emails to an HR employee. Pappas stated that “there have been numerous missing entries on the food service logs, out of code products in the walk-in cooler not discarded, product put out for sale not logged on the service logs, and product left out for sale after the allowable selling times—errors that Bart admits. Bart was fired that day. The parties agree that Pappas was involved in the decision to terminate Bart’s employment.
Can Still Prove Discriminatory Discharge
The trial court dismissed Bart’s discriminatory discharge claim. In doing so, the trial court reasoned that Bart’s “acknowledgement that the reason provided for her termination was factually accurate and valid under [Golub’s] polies and procedures” was “dispositive” of her claim that she was unlawfully fired because of her sex. In other words, the trial court ruled that because Bart admitted to the behavior underlying Golub’s stated reason, Bart could not prove that she was fired because of her sex in violation of Title VII. On appeal, the U.S. Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision and reinstated Bart’s discriminatory discharge claim.
In reversing the trial court, the Second Circuit found that trial court erred in ruling that an employee’s admission that the proffered reason for the termination was true or factually accurate was dispositive of a discriminatory discharge claim under Title VII. The appellate court explained that an employee claiming a discriminatory discharge under Title VII can prevail by showing that “the employer’ stated reason is false” or by showing that the “employer’s stated reason, although factually accurate, is not the only reason, because the employer’s decision” was “motivated, at least in part,” by the employee’s race, national origin, sex, pregnancy, or religion. Thus, an employee’s admission that the employer’s articulated reason for the termination was true or factually accurate does not preclude the employee from prevailing in a discriminatory discharge case under Title VII, so long as the employee has evidence that the employer’s decision was also motivated, at least in part, by the employee’s race, national origin, sex, pregnancy, or religion.
In applying these principles, the Second Circuit found that Bart “adduced competent evidence” that Pappas—the employee involved in her termination—harbored “gender-based bias against her.” In support of this finding, the court of appeals pointed out that Bart “testified that Pappas made several remarks to her, including close in time to the firing, insinuating that he believed that a man would perform better in Bart’s role than a woman would.” Pappas’ alleged gender-based discriminatory comments, the Second Circuit concluded, “are sufficient to support of a finding of discriminatory motive.” In other words, Pappas’ alleged gender-based discriminatory comments were evidence that the decision to terminate Bart’s employment was based, at least in part, on her sex even though the articulate reason for her termination was true or factually accurate.
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Citrus County Discrimination Lawyers
Based in Ocala, Florida and representing workers throughout Florida, our employment discrimination attorneys in Citrus County, Florida have fought for the rights of employment discrimination victims for more than twenty years. If you have experienced employment discrimination or have questions about your rights as an employment discrimination victim, please contact our office for a free consultation with our employment discrimination lawyers in Citrus County, Florida. Our employee rights law firm takes employment discrimination cases on a contingency fee basis. This means that there are no attorney’s fees incurred unless there is a recovery and our attorney’s fees come solely from the monetary award that you recover.
